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Geoffrey Butler, Clerk 
Utah Supreme Court 
Room 332 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
RE: Utah v. Vijil, No, 20111 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the ap-
pellant, Daniel Vijil wishes to advise the Court of supplemental authority 
which is pertinent to this action. 
The appellant advised the Court, by a letter dated June 25, 1985 
(photocopy attached), of a decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court, State of 
New Mexico ex rel. Department of Human Services v. Jojola (1983), 99 N.M. 
500, 660 P.2d 590, which is addressed to the issue of state subject matter 
jurisdiction in a reservation based paternity and support action. The 
appellant has now learned that this decision was brought upon on appeal before 
the U.S. Supreme Court (No. 82-2049). The Motion To Dismiss (photocopy 
attached) filed by the State of. New Mexico indicates that the appeal had be-
come moot due to the amendment of state regulations which now defer to tribal 
jurisdiction. Whatever weight is accorded the Jojola decision should be 
determined in reference to these amendments. 
Thank you. 
Yours ^sincerely, 
Attorney at Law 
SB:sb 
xc 
Geoffrey Butler, Clerk 
13 February 1986 
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cc: Mark Wainwright, Esq. 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Herb Yazzie, Esq. 
NAVAJO NATION DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
Post Office Drawer 2010 
Window Rock, Arizona 86515 
Bruce Halliday, Esq. 
San Juan County Courthouse 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
IN THE 
W4y*£»i* . * . * * * * * W * 
^iMMY ANDREW JOKJLAT 
Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF NEW MEXiCO. EX REL , 
HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, 
Appellee 
ON APPEAL FROM THE S U ? R Z J 2 COUR1] 
Of THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 
MCT.ON OF APPELLEE TO DISMISS 
** *** *' *
 s 
Attorney General of New Mexico 
Assistant Attorney General 
Santa re i\ew Ivl j \ co S^SC-
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
(1) Whether actions and events subsequent to the New Mexico 
Supreme Court decision have rendered moot the question 
of which forum should determine paternity and set a leve2 
of child support. 
(2) Whether the question of who must reimburse the Human 
Sendees Department for expenditures on behalf of the 
dependent minor child or in which court suit must be 
brought is ripe for review prior to a determination of 
paternity, and if so, whether that question should be 
addressed by this Court prior to its being addressed by 
the New Mexico Supreme Court. 
PAirriE-
The parties to the proceedings are identified in the caption 
of this case. 
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1 
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL 
The appellee State of New Mexico, ex rel Human Services 
Department (hereinafter Department) respectfully moves the 
Court under Rule 16 to dismiss this appeal because there is no 
basis for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1257(2), and because 
events subsequent to the New Mexico Supreme Court decision 
have rendered this case moot. In addition the nonjuiisdictional 
questions appellant Jimmy Jojola (hereinafter Jojola) seeks to 
raise are premature.1 
Because of subsequent events the questions which Jojola 
seeks to present do not accurately state the questions before 
this Court. The questions now presented by this appeal are: 
(1) Whether actions and events subsequent to the New 
Mexico Supreme Court decision have rendered moot 
the question of which forum should determine paternity 
and set a level of child support. 
(2) Whether the question of who must reimburse the 
Human Services Department for expenditures on behalf 
of the dependent minor child or in which court suit 
In January of 1983, a new administration took office in New Mexico 
and began instituting substantial policy changes in the state's relationship 
to Indian Tribes in New Mexico. These changes necessarily occurred after 
the appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court was briefed and argued in 
1982. An analysis of the state's position on domestic relations matters 
involving Indians was begun following the state Supreme Court's "decision. 
The determination was made to defer to Tribal sovereignty in matters 
such as those presented by this appeal. The actions of the Department 
in developing new manual policy followed promptly. It was decided that 
Mr. Jojola be given the benefit of the new policy while the manual revision 
2 
must be brought is ripe for review prior to a determina-
tion of paternity, and if so, whether that question 
should be addressed by this Court prior to its being 
addressed by the New Mexico Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
following additional facts should be added to those 
nted in appellant's Jurisdictional Statement:2 
On July 1, 1983, the Department issued a new formal 
policy governing the procedure to be followed in all 
cases seeking to establish paternity and set levels of 
child support where the child, mother and putative 
father are all Indians residing on the reservation. The 
new policy recognizes the right of the Indian people 
on a reservation to make their own determination of 
paternity and to set levels of child support. It further 
states the Department's policy will be to assist the 
mother of the dependent child in tribal court to estab-
lish paternity. See Appendix A.3 
jponsibility to pursue paternity and child support obligations is 
ted to the state by Subchapter IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 
. §651, et seq. (Aug. 14,1935, c.531, Title IV, §451, as added Jan. 4, 
Pub.L. 93-647, §101(a), 88 Stat. 2351, and amended Aug. 13, 
Pub.L. 97-35, Title XXIII, 12332(a), 95 Stat. 861). The state has 
ated the Department to fulfill these responsibilities by Section 
7 and 27-2-28, N.M.S.A. 1978. These sections are set forth in full 
>endix E. 
i additional actions by the Department changing procedures and 
and obtaining dismissal of the original action in state court are 
rly to be considered by this Court. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 
3 
2. On or about June 13, 1983,DyanaAbeita, the mother 
of the dependent minor child, filed a paternity and child 
support action on behalf of the child in Isleta Tribal 
Court. The Department's attorney represents her in this 
action. See Appendix B. 
3. The Department filed a motion to dismiss its petition 
in the District Court of the State of New Mexico on 
June 13, 1983, on the grounds that the paternity issue 
would be pursued in the Tribal Court of Isleta. See 
Appendix C. On June 29, 1983, this motion was granted 
over the objection of Jojola, and the petition to deter-
mine paternity and set child support was dismissed 
without prejudice. See Appendix D. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THIS CASE IS MOOT BECAUSE THE DEPARTMENT 
HAS ISSUED A FORMAL POLICY REQUIRING THAT 
PATERNITY PETITIONS SUCH AS THE ONE IN 
THIS CASE BE FILED IN TRIBAL COURT. 
The Department has issued a formal policy statement which 
details the procedures to be followed in all cases similar to 
the one presented by this appeal.4 The policy statement 
The policy statement has been codified as Section 529, Case Application 
and Referral Procedures of the Department's Program Manual, Income 
Support Division, Volume III, Child Support Enforcement Program, and is 
reproduced in full and attached as Appendix A. The policy statement is 
repeated verbatim as Section 548 (Case Processing—Establishment of a 
Support Obligation), Section 559.1 (Case Processing—Establishment of 
Paternity), Section 569*2 (Case Processing—Enforcement), and Section 
4 
s that in all such cases, in which the mother, putative 
r, and child are Indians who reside on the reservation, 
>atemity petition shall be filed in the Tribal Court of 
etent jurisdiction. This type of formal policy statement 
nes part of the organic law of the State of New Mexico. 
Department is bound by the manual provision, which is 
ced by the courts as the law of the state. See Hillman v. 
h and Social Services Department, 92 N.M. 480, 590 P.2d 
It. App. 1979). 
rmal changes of a Department's policy go far beyond the 
cessation of challenged activity by the defendants in 
d States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953), 
\ the Court was concerned that the defendants could 
return to their old ways. For the state to return to its 
M ways would require the same elaborate policy and man-
ivisions as have just transpired in instituting the changes 
I in footnote 4, supra. Formal policy statements are 
lal controls which the agency imposes on its own opera-
and exercise of power. Federal courts have recognized 
similar statements by federal agencies have the force of 
°ickus v. United States Board of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 
(D.C. Cir. 1974), or create binding law, as the court 
in Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 90 U.S. App. D.C. 135, 
7
.2d 329 (1952). This type of change in law, applicable 
e case at bar and to all future cases, obviates the need 
i Article III court to resolve the issues raised by the prior 
aversy. 
i promulgation of this policy renders this case moot be-
it no longer presents a justiciable case or controversy. 
manual revisions are filed with the Records Center pursuant to the 
Records Act, Section 14-3-1, et seq., N.M.S.A. 1978, and State 
5 
The Department has substantially adopted the position urged 
by Jojola, and the parties are in agreement on the issue pre-
sented for adjudication. A ruling from the Supreme Court of 
the United States now could not give Jojola any relief that he 
does not already have from the state. Consequently a decision 
by this Court would be merely advisory. As the Court has 
repeatedly noted, the Constitution of the United States limits 
the federal courts to adjudication of cases and controversies 
and bars advisory opinions. U.S. CONST. arLJII , §2; Lmery_ 
Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306, n.3 (1964). 
The facts presented by this appeal are clearly encompassed 
by the new policy statement's provisions. Pursuant to the 
established •policy, the Department is pursuing its remedies in 
Tribal Court where the parties are all Indians residing within the 
reservation. Mr. Jojola, Ms. Abeita and her son, Jonathan 
Abeita, are all enrolled members of the Isleta Tribe and reside 
on the Isleta reservation. Jurisdictional Statement, p. 14. 
At the time the notice of appeal was filed in this case, a live 
controversy affecting the rights of Jojola existed. Since that 
time, however, the Department codified its policy decision to 
defer to Indian Tribal sovereignty in paternity determinations 
such as presented here. The controversy that was present when 
the case was initiated no longer exists and because the 
controversy must continue at the appellate or certiorari review 
stage, this case is now moot. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 
(1973). 
Where changes have occurred such as here, this Court must 
review the decision below in light of the law "as it npw stands, 
not as it stood when the judgment below was entered." 
Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U.S. 412, 414 
(1972); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969). The promulga-
tion of a formal manual revision by the Department extends the 
6 
ction of the policy not only to Jojola but to all similarly 
ted persons. 
n 
THE DEPARTMENT HAS SOUGHT AND OBTAINED A 
DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION IN STATE DISTRICT COURT 
THEREBY MAKING THIS APPEAL MOOT. 
i June 13, 1983, the Department filed a Motion to Dismiss 
case in the District Court of New Mexico. This motion was 
ted on June 29, 1983. The Motion and the Order granting 
i attached as Appendices C and D, respectively. The cause 
remanded_to that court on March 31, 1983, by the New 
LCO Supreme Court. In conformance with the new policy, 
Department will no longer pursue this case in the state's 
ts. 
lie legality of the forum initially chosen by the Department 
e basis of the lawsuit on appeal. The withdrawal or volun-
dismissal of the legal action which is the basis of the appeal 
f renders the appeal moot. Williams v. Simons, 355 U.S. 
1957). There is no viable case or controversy of the kind ne-
iry "to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of 
" Hall v. Seals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969). All the parties to 
action are in agreement that this case should not be liti-
d in state court and further that appropriate jurisdiction for 
rminations of paternity lies in the Tribal Court. The dis-
;al by the state court leaves extant only the paternity 
on of the mother in Tribal Court, and no justiciable con-
ersy remains before this Court. 
7 
ni. 
ANY DETERMINATION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
REIMBURSEMENT FOR PAST CHILD SUPPORT 
IS PREMATURE AND NOT RIPE FOR DECISION. 
A noncustodial parent is liable to the Department in the 
amount of the public assistance paid to persons to whom 
that parent owes a duty of support. Section 27-2-28, N.M.S.A. 
1978. No action can he for such repayments, however, until 
a determination of paternity is made. Neither the state district 
court nor the New Mexico Supreme Court has addressed the 
merits of this case; therefore, no determination has been made 
of the paternity of Jonathan Abeita. Until such time as the 
paternity of the dependent child is determined, any attempt 
to collect for sums expended by the Department and the 
federal government on the child's behalf would be premature. 
Any action against Jojola in any court to collect under the 
repayment statute would not be ripe for decision at this time. 
This Court should decline to decide this matter because it is 
not yet ripe for review. 
The "basic rationale [of the ripeness doctrine] is to prevent* 
the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from 
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over admin-
istrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial 
interference until an administrative decision has been formal-
ized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging 
parties." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
Whether Jojola owes any obligation to repay the. sums ex-
pended under the Public Assistance Act (§§27-2-1, et seq.9 
N.M.S.A. 1978) is premature absent an adjudication that he 
is a "noncustodial parent [who] owes a duty of support.** 
§27-2-28(A), N.M.S.A. 1978. A decision anticipating the De-
8 
:s that the Isleta Tribal Court will determine that Jojola is 
the dependent child's natural father. Until this issue is 
Ived by the Tribal Court, the Department cannot know 
t action it will take.6 
lie New Mexico Supreme Court did not address this 
.er in its opinion and thereby implicity recognized that 
question was premature. Moreover, because the New Mex-
Supreme Court did not make any decision concerning 
arsement actions, this Court should not assume juris-
on to decide such a question. 
IV 
JOJOLA CANNOT INVOKE 28 U.S.C. §1257(2) 
WHERE THE NEW MEXICO SUPREME COURT HAS NOT 
LULED ON THE VALIDITY OF ANY NEW MEXICO STATUTE. 
jola contends that he comes within the appeals provisions 
8 U.S.C. §1257 (2), by claiming that assumption of juris-
on by the New Mexico courts would be repugnant to the 
;titution, treaties or laws of the United States. However, 
VTew Mexico Supreme Court in deciding this case did not 
.i the question of the validity of any New Mexico statutes 
has Jojola raised any such issue in his jurisdictional state-
L Until the New Mexico Supreme Court analyzes and 
on the relevant statutes and treaties as applied to the 
cular facts of an individual case or controversy, and rules 
the federal statutes or treaties are invalid, or that New 
suant to Section 529, et at, of the Child Support Enforcement Pro-
Manual, any action to collect past Aid to Families with Dependent 
ren (AFI)C) support must be approved by the Chief of the Child 
9 
Mexico statutes are valid which are allegedly repugnant to the 
Constitution, treaties or federal statutes, this Court has no 
justiciable case before it. Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253 
(1944). See Baltimore & Potomac R. Co. v. Hopkins, 130 U.S. 
210(1889). 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, Appellee Department respectfully submits that 
the questions upon which this cause depends are moot, 
premature and so insubstantial as not to need further argument, 
and Appellee Department respectfully moves the Court to 
dismiss this^appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL G. BARDACKE 
Attorney General of New Mexico 
WILLIAM G. WALKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 2348 
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504-2348 
(505)827-4122 
Counsel for Appellee 
July 12,1983 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
William G. Walker, hereby certify, pursuant to Rule 28 of 
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, that on 
12th day of July, 1983, I served the requisite number of 
5S of the foregoing Motion To Dismiss by first class mail 
ounsel of record for Appellant, Anthony F. Little, Indian 
>io Legal Services, Inc., Star Route Box 38, Santa Ana 
T9 Bernalillo, NM 87004. 
WILLIAM G. WALKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
la 
APPENDIX A 
N.M. Human Services Dept. Program Manual, Income Support 
Division, Vol. Ill 
529 Deference to Indian Tribal Sovereignty 
The Human Services Department recognizes the right of 
Indian people residing on the reservation to resolve fundamental 
issues in the area of domestic relations within the framework 
of established principles of Indian Tribal sovereignty. As a 
result, and notwithstanding the holding of the New Mexico 
Supreme Court in State of New Mexico ex rel. Human Services 
Department v. Jojola, NM , 660 P.2d 590 (1983), 
CSEB will mot seek to establish the paternity in State Court 
of putative Indian fathers who are amenable to suit in Tribal 
Court where the mother, putative father, and child reside 
within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. In all such 
cases, a paternity petition shall be brought in the name of the 
natural mother, individually and as the natural guardian of the 
child, in the Tribal Court of competent jurisdiction. If the 
putative father is not amenable to suit in the Tribal Court or 
the Tribal Court will not exercise personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction, a paternity action may be brought in State court 
only upon the prior written approval of the Chief of the Child 
Support Enforcement Bureau and the General Counsel of the 
Department. 
No action to enforce an AFDC support obligation may be 
brought against an absent Indian parent who resides on the 
reservation without the prior written aprroval of the Chief of 
the Child Support Enforcement Bureau and the General Coun-
sel of the Department. No action to enforce a non-AFDC sup-
port obligation may be brought in State Court against an absent 
Indian parent who resides on the reservation without the prior 
2a 
APPENDIX B 
TRIBAL COURT OF ISLETA PUEBLO 
^A ABEITA,
 P e t i t i o n e r ^ 
Y JOJOLA, Respondent. 
PATERNITY PETITION 
mes now petitioner, Dyana Abeita, and states unto the 
t: 
This petition is filed pursuant to Section 1-1-20 of the 
Code authorization suits to determine paternity and child 
Petitioner and respondent are members and residents of 
>ueblo. 
On October 13, 1979, petitioner gave birth to a child, 
than Abeita, who is also a member and resident of this 
io. 
Respondent is the natural father of Jonathan Abeita 
should be required to contribute to the support of the 
r child according to his means. 
Respondent has refused to provide for the support of 
linor child. 
fflEREFORE, petitioner prays the Court for: 
An order determining the respondent to be the natural 
\T of petitioner's child, Jonathan Abeita. 
An order requiring respondent to support the child 
rding to his means. 
Such other relief as to the Court seems reasonable. 
s/ Carrell Ray 
3a 
PETITIONER VERIFICATION 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ) 
) 
COUNTY OF BERNALILLO) 
Diana Abeita, being duly sworn states that she is the peti-
tioner in the matter herein and that she has read the foregoing 
petition and knows the contents thereof and that the same is 
true of her own knowledge except as to matters herein stated 
to be alleged on information and belief, and as to them she 
believes them to be true. 
s/ Dyana Abeita 
Petitioner 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 
15 day of June, 1983. 
LeRoy J. Moore 
Notary Public-New Mexico 
My Commission Expires 5/2/85 
4a 
APPENDIX C 
TE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF BERNALILLO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
TE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel. 
IAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, 
Petitioner, 
-vs- DR-81-1660 
tfY ANDREW JOJOLA, 
Respondent. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
omes now petitioner through Assistant Attorney General 
ell Ray and moves the Court for its order of dismissal 
Lout prejudice for the reason that the paternity issue will 
pursued in the Tribal Court of Isleta Pueblo as requested 
espondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
s/ Carrell Ray 
Assistant Attorney General 
909 Virginia NE, Suite 101 
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 
(505) 841-4582 
rtify that I mailed a copy of 
foregoing instrument to 
osing counsel of record this 
lay of June, 1983 
CR 
5a 
APPENDIX D 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF BERNALILLO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel. 
HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, 
Petitioner, 
-vs- TDR-SI-I66CT 
JIMMY ANDREW JOJOLA, 
Respondent 
ORDER 
This matter having come before the Court on petitioner's 
motion to dismiss, petitioner appearing in person by and 
through Assistant Attorney General William Walker and Barbara 
A. Brown, respondent appearing by and through his attorney, 
Anthony F. Little and the Court being advised in the premises, 
IT IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED that the 
above cause is dismissed pursuant to petitioner's motion, with-
out prejudice. 
s/ Judge A. Joseph Alarid 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Approved by: 
Assistant Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
Anthony F. Little 
4a 
APPENDIX C 
TE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF BERNALILLO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
LTE OF NEW MEXICO, ex reL 
VIAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, 
Petitioner, 
-vs- DR-81-1660 
MY ANDREW JOJOLA, 
Respondent. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
tomes now petitioner through Assistant Attorney General 
rell Ray and moves the Court for its order of dismissal 
lout prejudice for the reason that the paternity issue will 
pursued in the Tribal Court of Isleta Pueblo as requested 
respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
s/ Carrell Ray 
Assistant Attorney General 
909 Virginia NE, Suite 101 
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 
(505) 841-4582 
rtify that I mailed a copy of 
foregoing instrument to 
>osing counsel of record this 
day of June, 1983 
CR 
5a 
APPENDIX D 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF BERNALILLO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex reL 
HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, 
Petitioner, 
-vs- ~~ DR-8T-T660 
JIMMY ANDREW JOJOLA, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
This matter having come before the Court on petitioner's 
motion to dismiss, petitioner appealing in person by and 
through Assistant Attorney General William Walker and Barbara 
A. Brown, respondent appearing by and through his attorney, 
Anthony F. Little and the Court being advised in the premises, 
IT IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED that the 
above cause is dismissed pursuant to petitioner's motion, with-
out prejudice. 
s/ Judge A. Joseph Alarid 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Approved by: 
Assistant Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
Anthonv F. Little 
6a 
APPENDIX E 
Mexico Statutes Annotated, 
ic Assistance Act 
-27. Single State agency; powers and duties, 
he human services department is designated as the single 
agency for the enforcement of child and spousal support 
nations pursuant to Title IV D of the federal act with the 
wing duties and powers: 
establish the paternity of a child in the case of the child 
i out of wedlock with respect to whom an assignment of 
sort rights has been executed in favor of the department; 
establish an order of support for children receiving aid 
'amilies with dependent children and, at the option of the 
artment, for the spouse or former spouse with whom such 
dren are living but only if a support obligation has been 
iblished with respect to such spouse or former spouse, for 
Dm no order of support presently exists and seek modifica-
1, based upon the noncustodial parent's ability to pay, of 
=+ing orders in which the support order is inadequate to 
jrly care for the child and the spouse or former spouse 
h whom the child is living; 
2. enforce as the real party in interest any existing order 
the support of children who are receiving aid to families 
h dependent children or of the spouse or former spouse with 
om such children are living; and 
D. represent nonaid families with dependent children in 
\ establishment and enforcement of paternity and child 
)port obligations, including locating the absent parent, for 
ich it shall charge the applicant a start-up fee of twenty 
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which costs shall be recovered from support paid. If the costs 
exceed the amount of one month's support obligation, then 
the monthly collection shall be limited to ten percent of the 
collection. Where the service rendered is solely for the collec-
tion of past-due support, the department shall levy a fee not in 
excess of that provided by the federal act, against the delin-
quent parent[9] which fee shall be in addition to the amount 
of the delinquency and collectible as other judgments. 
27-2-28. Liability for repayment of public assistance. 
A. A noncustodial parent is liable to the department in the 
amount of the public assistance lawfully and properly furnished 
to the children, and the spouse or former spouse with whom 
such children are living, to whom the noncustodial parent owes 
a duty of support; except that if a support order has been 
entered, liability for the time period covered by the support 
order shall not exceed the amount of support provided for in 
the order, and provided that no claim not based upon a prior 
judgment can be made by the department for reimbursement 
for any period more than six years prior to the date of filing of 
any action seeking payment. 
B. Amounts of support due and owing for periods prior 
to the granting of public assistance shall be paid to and retained 
by the department to the extent that the amount of assistance 
granted exceeds the amount of the monthly support obligation. 
C. Amounts of support collected which are in excess of the 
amounts specified in Subsections A and B of this section will be 
paid by the department to the custodian of the child. 
D. No agreement between any custodian of a child and a 
parent of that child, either reUeving the parent of any duty of 
child or spousal support or responsibility or purporting to settle 
8a 
present or future support obligations, either as a settle-
or prepayment, shall act to reduce or terminate any rights 
e department to recover from that parent for support pro-
l, unless the department has consented to the agreement in 
ng. 
The noncustodial parent shall be given credit for any 
ort actually provided, including housing, clothing, foodjtt 
paid prior to the entry of any order for support. The non-
>dial parent has the burden on the issue of any payment. 
